One evening, after participating in an Arab nationalist demonstration in
Najaf against the communists during the first few months of the Qasim regime, I
came to see as-Sadr at his sirdab (a basement where Najafis go to escape the
desert heat). I found him indulging as usual in his juristic study. He was
studying Akhund's (Al-Khurasani's) book of usul, al-Kifaya I slapped him on the
back and said, for God's sake, get out of this sirdab and see what is going on
in real life. People are fighting in the streets and you are still reading
Kifayah and busying yourself with "Akhund said, and I say..."
From an interview with Talib al-Rifa'i
It is a phenomenon in Shi’ism that the leading mujtahids in the same age group
become maraja’ when the previous generation of senior maraja’ have all passed
away - at least those who aspire to this position. It is sometimes said that
what ultimately distinguishes one of them above all others (making him the grand
marja’) is not his merits or qualifications, but, rather, the death of his
peers. For example, it could be argued that Khu’i did not really become the
grand marja’ of the Shi’a until the death of Khomeini, though Khu’i’s muqallids
always far outnumbered Khomeini’s. Gulpaygani only became known as the marja’ al
azim of the Shi’i world when all of his peers, including Khomeini and Khu’i, had
died. Furthermore, no one could really be a contender for the marja’iyya until
Gulpaygani’s death, which then opened a window of opportunity for this "younger"
generation of senior ulama. Competition tends to be more intense after one marja’
has dominated the arena for so many years, as did Khu’i. He, along with other
senior ulama, produced numerous students, many of whom would be qualified to
become maraja’ and "whose time" could be said to have come. While the issue of
the marja’iyya has gained international attention since the Iranian revolution
and particularly since the deaths of Khomeini and Khu’i, the situation we are
witnessing is not at all new. The death of the Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim
also precipitated profound competition. Though in Najaf Khu’i rapidly became
distinguished as the senior mujtahid, there were others waiting for their
opportunity to lead the community. One such person was Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr, a
student of Khu’i’s. While Baqir as-Sadr aspired to the marja'iyya , laying the
ground work for his ascension to this role, he also set his sights on reforming
this institution, which he saw as having enormous potential for bettering his
community. In this paper, I will discuss the reforms that Baqir as-Sadr put
forward. His execution by the Iraqi government in 1980 cut short his efforts for
reform, yet many of his ideas have survived him, his books being read by Shi’a
and Sunni Muslims world wide, as well as by Western scholars of Islam.
Background
Born in Kazimayn in northern Baghdad circa 1936 (there is some dispute over the
exact date) to a prominent clerical family, Baqir as-Sadr lived as most students
in the hawzas of Najaf: aloof from politics. His friend, Seyyed Talib Rifa’i,
who was a student in the hawza with as-Sadr, told me during one of my interviews
with him that he encouraged Baqir as-Sadr to participate in political activities
and to assist in the formation of the Da’wa Party. Rifa’i himself was associated
with the Tahrir party, a Sunni-based organization, influenced by the Ikhwan, and
founded by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, a jurist of Jerusalem in the 1940s. In the
absense of a Shi’i political organiztion, it was not uncommon for politically
active jurists or Islamists to join Sunni organizations despite the theological
differences between the two sects. However, theological differences ultimately
drove a wedge between the Sunni and Shi’i members, with the Shi’i members seeing
a need to build their own organization, especially in the face of the challenge
of communism which grew after the 1958 Iraqi revolution. Thousands of Shi’a were
being influenced by this ideology and the jurists saw it as a tremendous threat
to the survival of religiosity and to the religious establishment. Hence,
Da’wa’s main thrust in those days was to counter communist ideas. Sadr played a
pivotal role. He was elected to be the faqhi al-hizb (jurist of the party), the
highest religious position in the party’s hierarchy. He was also instrumental in
writing its main political doctrine and platforms. In the party, he was exposed
to the political writings of the main leftest and Sunni parties that were active
in Iraq, ideas that helped shape his own religious and political views. Sadr’s
involvement in Da’wa was highly controversial in Najaf and eventually he, as
well as the sons of Muhsin Hakim, were forced to abandon the party. After
leaving Da’wa, Sadr focused on preparing himself for the marja’iyya. This was
done with the encouragement of his Da’wa associates who saw Baqir as-Sadr’s rise
to the marja’iyya as being their best hope for kindling a revolutionary change
in religious academic circles. In order to achieve his goals, Sadr began
teaching graduate courses in the fields of fiqh and usul (bahth al-kharij) and
compiling his lectures for publication. Yet, he had to be careful not to appear
to be competing with his mentor, Khu’i, to whom he continued to defer for the
remaining years of his life.
Baqir as-Sadr’s Innovations
Baqir as-Sadr saw the traditional methods of teaching in the hawza as being
archaic and lamented the lack of accountability in the system. In the
traditional hawza students are free to join any class of their choice. There are
no homework requirements, no examinations to test the students' progress, nor
set limits on the duration of completion of the course. In the bahth al-kharij
(the most advanced level of study), students may keep attending the classes
indefinitely. In the lower levels of muqadimat and situh , students may keep
changing their teachers as they please. Therefore, there is no way for the hawza
to monitor the academic level of students. The problem is accentuated by the
fact that once students are in the hawza , they can wear the turban and be
considered as part of the ulama class. Furthermore, they can leave the hawza
without an ijaza (certificate) and proceed to preach in local communities. In
such cases they can function independently, with no accountability to the
marja'iyya . They are also in a position to manipulative because of competition
among the various maraja'. Sadr wanted students to be required to pass at an
acceptable level certain required courses before they are able to leave the
hawza. Moreover, he wanted the marja'iyya to have full control of all religious
centers so that no cleric could head a congregation without an ijaza from a
marja'. This would help ensure that clergy would be competent jurists and
religious guides. One of his first tasks was to introduce ideas taken from
modern-style secular universities. He participated in a pilot project to
establish the ‘sul al-Din college in Baghdad in 1964 and in setting up its
academic curriculum. However, his efforts to implement reforms in the hawza
itself faced stiff resistence not only from students but from the religious
establishment as well. Thus, he had to resort to teaching in the classical style
of the hawza : commenting and citing arguments and counter arguments of previous
jurists on a particular legal matter. However, he expressed reservations about
doing so and, as a result of his distaste for what he considered an archaic
style. . He completed only the first part of the lessons in fiqh , namely, "Taharat,"
(purity), doing so in a period of four years. These lessons resulted in a
four-volume treatise written by his students and edited by him. It was later
published as Buhuuth fi sharh al T’rwah al Withqa. The publication of some of
his writings, Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy) and Ihtasatuna (Our Economics), as
well as his work on fiqh , drew admiration from educated, reform-minded Shi’a
who began to advocate for his marja’iyya. They wanted as-Sadr to write his own
risaleh so that they could refer to his religious opinions. Rather than write a
risaleh , he chose to record his opinions as footnotes to Muhsin al-Hakim’s
risaleh, Minhaj al-Salihyn. While writing a risalah as a footnote to a previous
one is common practice, yet, in other respects, as-Sadr's risaleh is highly
atypical. In order to popularize his fatwas among the masses, he wrote his
religious opinions in a style that could be easily understood by lay people,
eliminating the jargon of jurisprudence that makes it difficult for the general
public to understand. He wrote his opinions in modern Arabic language,
addressing himself, not principally to other jurists as is usually done, but to
Islamic activists, professionals, college students, and other educated people in
society to whom he was particularly eager to reach. His Al-Fatawa al-Wadihah is
unique in its style among such works and gained popularity among Sunni and Shi’a
alike because of its straighforward language and detailed expositions of fatwas.
Perhaps most importantly, it dwelt on contemporary problems. Additionally, Sadr
presented a new taxonomy for legal codes that was a clear departure from the
classical treaties of fatwas. The legal Shi’i texts always consist of two major
categories; ibadat (worship) and mu’amalat (Transactions). Sadr thought that
such a bipolar scheme was too broad and awkward since scholars had to ignore
some aspets of Islamic law, or to place others in inappropriate legal
categories. Sadr proposed in the introduction of Fatawa that the new taxonomy of
the Islamic legal system should be divided into four main categories: 1. Ibadat
, which includes the individual acts of worship that require niyah (intention)
on the part of the worshipper 2. Amwal (financial capital) which includes all
public and private economic transactions 3. al-’ilaqat al-Khasa (Private
affairs) which includes matters pertaining to family relations; and 4. al-’ilaqat
al-’ama’ (Public affairs) which includes social relations and state authority.
This taxonomy has implications for social affairs. For example, traditionally,
matrimonial issues are listed under the subheading "financial contract." This
subheading emhasizes the legalistic and structural nature of marriage and
male/female relationships. It reflects the notion that the woman is purely a
sexual partner and the man a financial master. In other words, the man gives a
dowry to a woman for the sexual services she provides. The relationship could
thereby be interepreted as "money for sex." By separating family issues under a
different heading; i.e., "Personal Conduct and Relationships," Sadr set out to
reinterpret the religious legal concepts and to give a new understanding to
them. With the publicaton of his religious opinions, Sadr’s relationship with
those close to Ayatollah Khu’i began to sour. In order to prove that he was not
challenging the authority of his teacher, Sadr asked one of his companions to
write a letter in the form of a question seeking Sadr’s opinion about the
marja’iyya. Sadr then replied to that letter at the same meeting, directing
people to follow the guidance of Ayatollah Khu’i. Sadr asked that his marja’iyya
not be publicly promoted, therefore, his muqallids generally consisted of those
who had already been won over to his approach to Islamic law. His followers were
drawn from the intellectual and upper middle class groups. They were mostly
Iraqis and many were fundamentalist activists and Da’wa Party members.
Sadr’s Conceptualization of the Marja’iyya
Of major concern to Baqir as-Sadr was the revamping of the marja’iyya so that it
could both fit into the modern world and effectively serve as a guide to mankind
in the present and future. He saw it has having enormous potential if certain
reforms were put in place. He also saw it as an institution that has changed and
evolved over the centuries, so that, therefore, there was justification for
making efforts to implement further changes. In one of Baqir as-Sadr’s lectures
Sadr divided the history of the marja’iyya into four stages. First was the
period which he referred to as the "Individual Marja’iyya" beginning with the
companions of the Imams until the time of TAlamah al-Hilli (d. 1325). During
this period, the marja’ served only as the source of religious laws for the Shi’
Certain things hold constant throughout the periods. For example, the maraja’
have traditionally conducted their policies and made their decisions on the
basis of their own individual styles, depending on an inner circle of close
associates and family members who gather information, make political statements
and commonly make important decisions. Thus, there was no fundamental pattern
either for the process of making decisions or for the content of those
decisions. The resulting inconsistencies have resulted, according to Sadr, in
social confusion which has weakened the relationship between the marja’iyya and
the people. Furthermore, there is little or no carry over of trained ulama who
could remain "in office" from one marja’iyya to another. Each marja’ has his own
entourage; i.e., his own hand-picked representatives and advisors, some of whom
are close relatives. In other words, each marja’ starts from "square one" to
conduct the course of his business. Therefore, each marja’ differs from all
others in his leadership capacity, crisis-management ability, and experience in
political affairs.
In order to enhance the power of the marja’iyya in society and to heighten its
effectiveness, as-Sadr wanted to transform what he called the "individualistic
marja’iyya " into an "institutional marja’iyyah." The mararja’ , according to
Sadr, must preside over a well-defined organized institution. It is only through
transforming the marja’iyya into a complex institution that it can influence
events and guide people effectively. The role of the marja’ , in Sadr’s thesis,
"al-Marja’iyya al-Mawd’iyya" , derives from his general view that mankind as
God's vicars on earth would always have a constant need for some sort of divine
intervention to protect him from corruption and to guide him towards the goals
of vicarage. Without this intervention, man can always be influenced by his
instincts and passions which weaken his potential for progress. . Accordingly,
God established the role of shahid (witness), the shahid being the one who would
take the responsibility for conveying divine guidance to mankind so as to
safeguard the believers from corruption. According to Sadr, the Quran designated
the Imams, and then the scholars of religious laws, specifically the maraja’, to
succeed the prophets in the role of shahid. Since the Imams and religious
jurists understand divine laws and revelations, they will take responsibility
for safeguarding the message of God to mankind, and take an active role in
guiding man in his historical mission under God. "The shahid , from an
ideological perspective, is the authority on belief and legislation who oversees
the social journey and its ideological suitability with the divine messsage. He
is also responsible for intervening when he sees any deviation from the right
path." The only difference among the three types of people who take the role of
shahid is that the prophet is the messenger who receives, delivers, and applies
the divine message, the imam is the one who is the divinely chosen guide that
interpets the message, and the marja’ is the one, according to Sadr, ...who
possesses, through his human efforts and long period of hard-work, the
comprehension of Islam from its original sources, as well as a deep piety that
disciplines him to control himself and his conduct. He must also possess a
suitable Islamic consciousness of his environment with all it overwhelming
conditions and interactions. The marja’ thus becomes the successor of the
prophets and imams for the ummah in terms of his being a source of guidance and
a center of leadership. The man who possesses the ordained qualifications
(knowledge of divine laws, Ilm ; and self control of conduct (Tadalah ) shall
take the responsibility of shahid. However, the marja’iyya is not assigned to
any particular person as is the case with the prophets or Imams.
It is the qualificaion for the role that becomes the important criterion to be
satisfied by suitable individuals. A wrong interpetaton of the role of shahid
occurs when it is thought of as belonging to the person of the marja’ rather
than to the role of the marja’iyya itself. The marja’ is the legitimate
successor of the imams by virtue of his ilm and adalah , although there are also
certain responsibilities for achieving specific goals connected with the role of
shahid . The marja’iyya in Shi'ism has entailed the selection of an individual
marja’ but has made the role of shahid the consequence of his ability, or the
function of the political conditions. However, inconsistencies in the maraja’s
activities, coupled with failure to define goals, have resulted in a weakening
of the role of shahid. Unless the marja’iyya entails certain well-defined
objectives, the ummah will find it difficult to ascertain its social mission.
Sadr believed that the current system of the marja’iyya has chronic
shortcomings, primarily that the marja’ did not rely on any institutional
structure to exercise his authority. Decisions concerning the welfare of the
whole community were made largely in consultation with relatives and close
associates. In keeping with his views on shahid as outlined above, he conceived
the idea of marja’iyya al-madu’iyya (objective authority) that would replace, in
the long run, the existing marja’iyya al-dhatiyah (individualistic authority).
In other words, Sadr believed that the focus would be on the "office" of the
marja’iyyah , rather than on the marja’.
The structure put in place, he maintained, would not only prevent the jurist
from making arbitrary decisions but would also serve to train new jurists for
the responsibilities of "shahid ." The power of the jurists would also be
checked by free competition for this position. Sadr prescribed establishing an
institution in which the marja’ himself forms the center, and where its
structure, role, and process are thoroughly defined. This would allow for
continuity and carry over of ideas and practices from one marja’ to the next. He
wanted an institution in which tasks and activites were specified and where
there was accountability on the part of each person involved in the marja’iyya .
He envisioned two types of organizational arrangements: the "office of the
marja’iyya ," which would be the central administrative office, and the
"representatives," who would act as the sociopolitical branches of the
marja’iyya . While in some sense, this arrangement already exists, it is in the
specific roles which Sadr envisioned that we come to see the significant
differences between his ideal system and the one that currently exists. The
central administrative office, in Sadr’s thesis, would initially consist of at
least six departments that perform the planning and executive activites of the
marja’iyyah and in which the marja’iyya is administered by experts. The
marja’iyya , later on, could further develop these offices as tasks and
responsibilites expand, to include the whole spectrum of affairs of the ummah.
These offices will "replace the court (of the marja’ ) which represents an
arbitrary individualistic structure made up of individuals grouped by chance who
fulfill some immediate needs but exhibit a superficial mentality without any
defined and clear objective." He wanted the marja’ to be at the top of a
pyramidal structure. The marja’ traditionally has been represented by ulama in
various parts of the world who serve the religious needs of Muslims and act as
liaison officers for the marja’ , carrying on such tasks as transmitting his
fatwas or collecting religious taxes. As-Sadr does not see this informal
relationship between the marja’ and his parochial representatives as being
effective in facilitating a centralized system. And centralization, he argues,
becomes indispensable in situations in which the marja’ seeks to commit himself
to achieving political goals or implementing radical change in the society.
Sadr’s prescription is to make the local representatives more active
participants in the process of the marja’iyya. He proposed that the marja’ form
a council that proposes policies and suggests courses of action for the marja’.
The council would consist of, in addition to the individuals of the six
committees of the central administration, the marja’s representatives and
high-ranking ulama. The whole religious establishment in this way becomes a full
participant in the decision making process of the marja’, an arrangement which
eventually would motivate commitment and ensure dedication to the marja’iyya.
Such a broad consultative process would protect the marja’iyya , in as-Sadr’s
view, from adopting policies that might be influenced by personal feelings. The
(institutional) administration would then replace the hashiyyah (the marja's
personal entourage), which is but an arbitrary irrational apparatus composed of
individuals gathered by coincidence...to meet immediate needs with a fragmented
mentality of no clear and specified objectives. Even the titles of the new
organizational structures would be modernized. For example, he proposed using
titles such as, "The Board of Trustees for the Religious Academies," "Propogation
Affairs Committee," "The Foreign Affairs Committee," and the "Political Task and
Outreach Committee." While Sadr concedes that the individualistic, traditional
practices have some positive aspects, such as quick action, higher levels of
secrecy, and limitations on the influence of unqualified people, the proposed
arrangement, he argues, would have greater and more important results (Sadr, p.
96) The formation of the central administration and "council of the marja’iyya,
would ensure the continuity of the role of the marja’ beyond his lifetime. The
structural organization would provide expertise and long-term planning for
achieving goals set by the previous marja’. In addition,the institution of the
marja’iyya would serve as a training field and selection agency for the new
marja’.
One of as-Sadr’s complaints had been with the traditional manner in which the
marja’ ascends to his rank. He complained that there were no specific
qualifications for the position except that of Ilm and adalah. Although these
qualificatons might be considered necessary for achieving the first goal of
shahid (i.e., safeguarding the divine message from corrution), qualifications
for the second role (i.e, guiding the ummah in its historical mission) are
lacking. Such a political/social role requires skills that go beyond mere
religious knowledge and righteous behavior. It requires an understanding of the
social conditions and the way in which these conditions need to be changed to
safeguard religion and guide the believers. Yet, Sadr did not suggest dispensing
with the old system altogether. In fact, in some respects, his prescription is
not at all a radical departure from the traditional system. Sadr still believed
that it was necessary to go through the traditional stages in which a marja’
builds up his credentials and gains trust and influence within the hawza and the
ummah. The marja’ who wishes to implement reforms must "start forming an
institutional structure gradually, such as establishing a limited number of
consultative committess and specialized (offices) to perform some of the tasks
of the marja’iyya. He must not act rashly and quickly in implementing changes so
as to avoid resistance and resentment from the traditional sector of the hawza
and the ummah who would not be aware of his objectives. Sadr believed that the
formation process of the institution should progress gradually; its evolution
should take place naturally. The marja’ , in bringing about changes, should
concentrate on educating the ummah to the point of realizing the goals and
benefits of the "objective marja’iyya. This way, the marja’iyya will develop as
a natural part of the culture of the umma and reach its maturity. It is only
then that the "objective marja’iyya" will enter its final stage of being the
sole marja’iyya and dominate religious authority that will guide the ummah
towards restoring the leading role of Islam in society.
Conclusions
The focus on the Iranian marja'iyya and the competition that has arisen among
the mujtahids since the death of Khomeini have overshadowed the life and
contributions of Baqir as-Sadr. Yet, I believe that his legacy will continue
through the debates taking place in religious, academic, and political arenas.
Baqir as-Sadr was a member of the Shi'i religious establishment and a pioneer of
reform. This made him both a focus of love and envy. He was not an outsider like
Ali Shariati of Iran, nor was he a scholar of dubious merit. He was a true
product of the hawza and also one of its greatest achievements. Yet, there is
much ambivalence about him. He was an inspiration to the youth and a bonafide
martyr on the one hand. But he was also a critic of the establishment and
considered detrimental to the traditional way of doing things. Modernization
brought changes to the hawza with regard to the sort of students who were
enrolling. Prior to mass, governmental education, the educational background of
the hawza students were mostly from elementary schools or basicaly illiterate.
During Baqir as-Sadr's time this changed so that students were likely to be
graduates of government high-schools and colleges. To such students the
traditional text books, such as Ansari's al-Makasib on fiqh and Kurasani's al-Kifayya
seemed arcane. For these students Baqir as-Sadr became the author of choice. On
the other hand, as-Sadr's Durus fi elim al-usul were written for university
students and continue to be used in the Arabic hawza in Qom. Sadr's intellectual
contributions have become the foundation for political Islam in the post-Iranian
revolution period. In the wake of the revolution, people wanted less rigorous
literature, turning to dogmatic journalistic writings and fire-breathing
political speeches. But after the dust settled somewhat, the Islamic
intelligencia and activists were confronted with social and political problems
that required complex answers. Today Sadr's writings are in demand to much the
same extent as those of the Iranian intellectual, Ali Shariati. Sadr's ideas and
contributions are used as the building blocks for the call for change in the
religious establishment. I believe that Sadr's call for reforms, religiously and
politically, will come to dominate the debates within the Islamic movements in
the decades to come.
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