A Critical Summary of Our Philosophy authored by Shaheed Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr
Preface:
Ever since man has attempted to determine his relation to the external world,
the formulation of world view has been a central problem of philosophic thought.
The author's aim is to present the world view of Islamic philosophy against the
backdrop of other views presented by modern Western philosophy, especially Marxism.
Two issues are involved in the difference between world views:
The first one relates to realistic and idealistic conceptions of the world.
Realism believes in the existence of an objective reality independent of mind,
while for idealism reality can be only mental. The second issue involves two
separate outlooks within realism: materialism and theological realism.
Materialism regards sensible matter as the common ground of all existence
including mind and consciousness. Theological realism (hitherto referred to as 'realism')goes
beyond matter and asserts the existence of an eternal and infinite cause as the
primary cause of all phenomena, including the mental and the material realms.
Correction of Some Errors: Here, it is necessary to correct the misconceptions n
of some modern writers. The first of these errors is to consider the conflict
between theology and materialism as the one between idealism and realism, as if
theological thought advocated idealism and materialism was the only
representative of realism.
The second is the accusation that the theistic world view attributes every
phenomenon to a supernatural cause and thus makes science impossible by
completely eliminating causality and law from the realm of nature. This
accusation is false, because theology considers God as a cause transcending
nature, as a power above nature and matter. This error involves a
misunderstanding of the place of the transcendent cause in the causal chain.
The third error is that of identifying spirituality with idealism, whereas
spirituality can be considered as an attribute of idealism as well realism; it
has a different meaning in each of these outlooks.
Thus there are three kinds of world views: idealism, materialism and theological
realism. Idealism was studied in Part 1, while discussing the theory of
knowledge. Materialism and theological realism will be studied in this part.
A Clarification: At the outset a number of points have to be clarified. Firstly,
what is the basic feature that distinguishes all the various versions of
materialism from theological realism, making them two conflicting schools? The
answer is that the basic distinguishing feature of materialism is its denial
that there is anything beyond the scope and realm of experimental science. Both
the theologian and the materialist accept the findings and formulations of
science, but they differ over the issue that there is an immaterial realm of
existence beyond the realm of experiment and sensible phenomena. The materialist
considers natural causation revealed by experiments as the sole ground of all
existence, including mind and consciousness. The theological realist, on the
contrary, regards the knowing subject and its knowledge as being of an
immaterial nature. Further, theological realism asserts that the developments
and movements studied by science are, in the ultimate analysis, attributable to
a cause transcending nature and the material world. The materialist denies this
and claims that no immaterial or transcendent causes are revealed in the field
of experiment; nature is dynamic, autonomous, self-sufficient and
self-contained.
It is clear that there is no dispute between theology and materialism with
regard to scientific truths. The theologian admits all scientific truths; he
just admits other truths and asserts the existence of a primary, non-sensible
and immaterial cause of nature's movements and phenomena.
Secondly, if the conflict between theology and materialism is that of
affirmation and negation, which of the two schools is responsible for giving
evidence in favour of its position? The theologian must offer reasons for his
affirmation and the materialist for his negation, for absolute denial like
absolute affirmation requires proof. The materialist, by his absolute denial, in
fact asserts that he has examined the entire realm of being and not found any
immaterial cause in it.
Now a second question arises : What kind of evidence that can be?
The answer is that the evidence for the affirmation or for the denial must be
based on reason, not on sense experience. This is contrary to the materialist
view, which considers sense experience as its evidence and claims that the
propositions of metaphysics and theology cannot in general be verified by sense
experience and that an analysis of experience and nature does not reveal the
existence of immaterial things. Now if materialism is correct in its claim that
sense experience and science do not constitute a proof for the propositions of
theology, then neither can they be proof for its absolute negation. Moreover,
the truths of science are not the subject of disputation between theology and
materialism. For the disputation relates rather to the philosophical
interpretation of these truths which asserts the existence of a cause
transcending the limits of sense experience. It is clear that sense experience
cannot be considered as a proof for the negation of a truth outside its own
limits.
Science does not affirm the materialist view of the world. All the truths
uncovered by science leave room for the assumption of a cause above matter.
Scientific experimentation cannot prove that matter is not created by an
immaterial cause. Therefore, the proof in support of materialism cannot be based
on scientific truths or sense experience. Rather, materialism is a philosophic
interpretation of experience and scientific truths, in the same way as
theological realism is; both of them give different interpretations to the
findings of science. The soundness of these interpretations cannot be
established on the basis of sense experience.
This leads us to a third question: If scientific experimentation is not
sufficient by itself for deciding the issue, is there any other means available
to the human mind? Al-Sadr's answer is that human reason is sufficient for
studying this issue, in the same way as it studies all scientific issues in the
light of primary rational knowledge, which is independent of experience. Thus
the method adopted by theological realism in demonstrating its propositions is
ultimately the same method by which we prove all scientific truths and laws.
Dialectics:
In classical Greek philosophy 'dialectics' meant a specific method of discussion
in which the debate between the representatives of opposite points of view
begins from preliminaries admitted by both the sides and proceeds until one of
the points of view is affirmed or a new conclusion is reached by the way of
synthesis of formerly opposite viewpoints.
Dialectic in modem Western philosophy is not a method of discussion but a method
of explaining reality and a general law of the universe according to which
movement is a continuous development of oppositions and contradictions, their
merging and reconciliation. The idea is an old one, foreshadowed by Empedocles
(who explained change as a conflict between the world forces of Love and Strife)
and Zoroaster, and embodied in the 'golden mean' of Aristotle, who held that
"the knowledge of opposites is one." Hegel was the first to establish a complete
logic (and metaphysics, which in Hegel is same as logic) on the basis of the
notion of dialectic.
In this logic, which is claimed to govern thought and existence, the fundamental
principle is one of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which involves a constant
'taking up' and reconciliation of pairs of contradictories in higher, more
comprehensive and penetrating ideas, until finally all oppositions are overcome
in the all-inclusive, all-reconciling and all-explaining Absolute Idea.
Hegel views conception as a hierarchy of syntheses whose skeleton is constructed
of ascending triads in which seemingly antagonistic concepts are reconciled by
dialectic in higher logical concepts. The most basic triad involving the
concepts of being and non-being as thesis and antithesis yields the synthetic
concept of becoming. The ideas of becoming and change involve the concepts of
identity and difference which are reconciled in the concept of essence. The
concepts of essence and existence, whole and part, appearance and reality are
resolved in the concepts of ground and force. The concept of force suggests
those of actuality and potentiality, whose dichotomy is reconciled in the
concept of fact. Also the notion of fact suggests those of necessity and
freedom, which are resolved in the concept of 'nature of things' . Now we are
confronted with the thesis and antithesis of substance and its attributes or
accidents. This contradiction is overcome by regarding the substance as the
cause of its attributes. Here cause contains the effect and so cause and effect
become one. Similarly final and efficient causation are synthesized in the
identity of means and end, which are neither external to nor distinct from each
other, by the concept of process. The world-process and the Absolute are one; it
is its own cause and its own goal. Hence the actual is the ideal; on the moral
plane, value and fact are identical.
Hegel's stand on the law of contradiction is dubious. As can be seen, the
driving motive behind every Hegelian synthesis is avoidance of contradiction;
i.e. it is inspired by belief in the impossibility of contradiction. Moreover,
he holds that the nature of Reality can be deduced from the sole consideration
that it must not be self-contradictory.
On the contrary, according to Hegel, truth and falsehood are not sharply defined
opposites, as is commonly supposed; nothing is wholly false and nothing that we
can know is wholly true. The truth is the 'whole', and nothing partial is quite
true. Whatever the value of his arbitrary analysis of concepts, it does not seem
correct, on the whole, to hold that Hegel rejects the principle of
contradiction.
Hegel is one of the most confused of philosophers. His philosophy is difficult
because it is difficult to understand confusion. The Marxist interpretations, or
misinterpretations, of Hegelian dialectics have added to this difficulty.
Therefore, when al-Sadr criticizes Hegel, he has the
Marxist interpretation of Hegel before him.
Thus when we see al-Sadr charging Hegel with the complete rejection of the
principle of contradiction and with holding that contradiction is not only the
primary principle of all knowledge but the general law of the universe, we
should understand him as criticizing the Marxist interpretation of dialectics
rather than Hegel. With these remarks now we turn to al-Sadr's criticism of
Marxist dialectics.
According to the Marxists, the dialectical method is characterized by four main
points: (1) The movement of development, (2) the contradiction of development,
(3) the leaps of development, and (4) the general linkage. These are supposed to
replace the four laws of thought recognized by formal logic: the law of
identity, the law of contradiction, the law of conversion, and the law of
demonstration. Al-Sadr then goes by one on to deal with the four points of the
dialectical logic one.
The Movement of Development:
The dialecticians reproach metaphysics and traditional logic for considering
nature in a static state of unchanging frozenness and stagnant stability and for
failing to reflect nature in its moving and progressive reality. According to
this claim, the poor metaphysician is an unperceptive being devoid of
consciousness and awareness who tails to notice change, transformation and
movement in the realm of nature.
Al-Sadr briefly recapitulates the standpoints of Greek philosophers regarding
motion. He refers to the paradoxes of Zeno (d.c. 430 B.C.) which were arguments
put forward to demonstrate the inconceiv ability of motion and to the acceptance
of motion by the Aristotelian school. The problem is related to the manner in
which motion was conceived: either as a succession of pauses in instants of time
or as a gradual advance in which there is no pause or rest.
Islamic philosophy pictures motion as the gradual actualization of the
potentiality of a thing. Development always consists of something actual and
something potential. Thus motion continues as long as a thing combines both
actuality and potentiality, existence and possibility. It possibility is
exhausted and no capacity for a new stage remains, motion ceases. Mulla Sadra
(1572-1641) demonstrated that motion does not pertain to the accidental surface
of things but goes on inside their very substances. Not only that, he also
showed clearly that motion and change is one of the necessary principles of
metaphysics.
The accusation of the dialecticians that metaphysics views nature as static and
frozen is due to their failure to understand motion in its proper philosophical
sense. The difference between the ways metaphysics and dialectical materialism
view motion consists of these two points:
Firstly, dialectical materialism views motion as being based on contradiction
and strife among contradictories. According to the metaphysics of Muslim
philosophers motion is a progression from one stage to an opposite stage without
involving the union of these opposites in any one of its stages.
Secondly, motion according to Marxism is not confined to external nature but is
also common to intellectual truths and ideas. On the basis of this, there can be
no absolute truths. According to Muslim philosophers, motion and development do
not intrude into the realm of knowledge and thought.
In regard to the first point, al-Sadr quotes a passage of Engels wherein motion
is conceived as continuous succession of contradiction and the temporary
reconciliation of this contradiction. "The simplest mechanical change in place,"
says Engels, "cannot, in the last analysis, occur except by means of the
presence of a certain body in a certain place at a certain moment and in another
place at the same moment.
In other words its being and non-being are simultaneously in one place."
This shows that the Marxists have not made much progress since Zeno in
conceiving motion. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi also raised similar objections against
the gradual emergence of a thing. The Marxists however differ from the ancient
Greek philosophers in that while the latter negated motion because it involves
contradiction, the former use this conception of motion to justify
contradiction.
The alleged contradiction in motion is only due to the confusion between
potentiality and actuality. At no stage does motion involve a specific rank in
actuality and another rank in potentiality. In other words, motion is a gradual
actualization of potentiality. The confusion in the Marxist conception of motion
arises due to its considering the entanglement of actuality and potentiality, or
their union in all the stages of motion as a union of actual opposites, a
continuous contradiction and a strife among the contradictories.
Now that motion is not the result of an inner cause in the form of conflicting
contradictories, it is also impossible for motion to be self-sufficient or to be
without an external cause that takes a thing continuously from potentiality to
actuality. Applying this idea to material nature as a whole, al-Sadr derives a
theological conclusion. The very existence of nature is a gradual progression
and continuous departure from potentiality to actuality. Since there can be no
self-sufficiency in the form of internal contradiction, the law of causality
forces us to recognize a cause transcending the limits of nature.
Al-Sadr then takes up the second thesis of dialectical materialism, that
dialectical change and development also occur in the realm of thought and truth,
which could not portray nature if thought did not grow and develop dialectically
like nature. "Reality grows", states a Marxist citation, "and the knowledge that
results from this reality reflects it, grows as it grows, and becomes an
effective element of its growth." Al-Sadr rejects this dialectical picture of
the movement of thought for the two following reasons:
1. The realm of nature involves fixed laws that reflect fixed truths in the
realms of thought and knowledge. Scientific knowledge reflects the permanent
underlying the transient in nature.
2. Firstly, concepts and ideas, no matter how accurate, do not possess the
actual properties of the things to which they pertain (e.g. the idea of radium
does not emit relation). Motion is one of those properties. A true idea,
although it reflects objective reality, need not possess the actual properties
of the reality it represents. Hence the concepts of changing things do not
change in order to reflect the objective reality of those things.
Al-Sadr then takes up the second Marxist argument intended to demonstrate the
dialectic development of thought, that knowledge is a natural phenomenon and
therefore governed by the same laws that rule nature. It changes and grows
dialectically as do all the phenomena of nature. The laws of the dialectic apply
to both matter and knowledge.
This argument rests on a pure materialistic explanation of knowledge. Al-Sadr
postpones the analysis of this view to an independent chapter, "knowledge", at
the end of the book. Here it suffices to put a question to the Dialecticians :
Is this materialistic explanation of knowledge reserved for the thought of the
dialecticians or does it extend also to the thought of others who reject the
dialectic? It becomes contradictory for Marxists to accuse other's thought of
being frozen and static; for if the dialectic is a natural law common to both
thought and nature, then it must apply to all human thought alike.
Thirdly, al-Sadr examines the Marxist effort to produce the history of science
as an empirical evidence for the dialectical movement of thought. Although
progress and development in human knowledge is an undeniable fact of history,
this development is not a kind of motion in the philosophic sense intended by
Marxism. It is no more than an increase in the quantity of truth and a decrease
in . the quantity of errors. When a theory moves from the level of hypothesis to
that of law, it does not mean that scientific truth has grown and altered. Al-Sadr
gives a few instances from the history of science to prove his point, He goes on
to remark that Marxism seeks to achieve two ends by applying the dialectic to
truth. First, it seeks to destroy metaphysics on which theology rests, by
holding that since truth moves and grows there can be no fixed and absolute
truth. Second, by denying absolute falsity it seeks to make all truth relative.
The Contradictions of Development:
Here al-Sadr takes up the Marxist rejection of the law of contradiction and the
claim of dialectical materialism that all change, becoming and development
involve contradiction. He explains the meaning of the law of contradiction and
points out that no logical person can deny the absolute validity of this law. He
points out that the Marxist denial is based on a misunderstanding of what is
meant by contradiction. He examines one by one seven instances of contradiction
cited by the Marxists, and argues that none of them involves a union of actual
contradictories. The first example is that of motion, which according to Engels
is in itself contradictory, As explained previously, there is no contradiction
in motion. The second example is that of the growth of the living body, which,
according to Engels, is at every moment itself and something other than itself.
Other examples include the contradiction: of the positive and the negative
charges, of action and reaction in mechanics, attack and defeat, advance and
retreat, victory and defeat in war, etc. Al-Sadr disposes of all these examples
by pointing out that actual opposites are not logical contradictories and that
no logical contradiction is involved in any of these cases.
Al-Sadr points out that this compulsive urge to see contradictions in everything
has political motives. In its effort to give a reassuring analysis of the
conflict between the capitalist and the working classes, Marx builds up a whole
social philosophy on the dialectic of contradictories that promises the ultimate
collapse of capitalism and the victory of communism.
However, the social and political application of the dialectic would lead to its
self-refutation. In the communist utopia envisioned by Marxism, in which classes
and class-conflict are abolished, social development would also come to a halt
due to the abolishment of contradiction.
Al-Sadr sarcastically remarks that such a static and stagnant fate has indeed
overtaken the communist states, wherein the subjugation of all thought to the
official doctrine has led to intellectual repression, stagnation, and
backwardness.
The Leaps of Development:
This is another idea in the Marxist ideological arsenal. According to the
dialecticians, gradual quantitative changes reach a point when the accumulated
change produces a sudden qualitative change. Hence development is not a circular
movement but a linear progression from one qualitative stage to a new one.
Moreover, they assert that this is a general law of nature. One of the examples
offered is that of some substances, like water, which pass from solid to liquid
state and from liquid to gaseous state at specific temperatures.
Al-Sadr points out that although instantaneous leaps do occur in a number of
natural phenomena, they are by no means general and do not hold true in the case
of all phenomena (e.g. biological organisms, language, etc.). In the example of
water, experimentation does not demonstrate that heating is a result of
contradiction, nor there is any dialectical development involved. Secondly,
neither the heating up of water nor its passage from one state to another is a
linear, irreversible progression. Thirdly, the leap from solid to liquid state
or from liquid to vapour state does not take place suddenly for the complete
mass of water heated. Why should, then, the leap in the social sphere be imposed
on society as a whole? Finally, al-Sadr points out, the change of state of water
is as much a matter of quantitative change from the viewpoint of science as the
change in temperature. Here al-Sadr seems to refer vaguely to the kinetic theory
of heat, according to which the changes of state are quantitatively related to
the speed of molecular movement and the force of molecular cohesion.
Al-Sadr goes on to criticize Marx's view of transformation of Surplus value into
capital as an instance of accumulated quantitative change passing into
qualitative change. Although he is right in pointing out that money does not
undergo any qualitative change by passing into capital, his insistence that the
change involved is merely verbal amounts to ignoring a significant economic fact
pointed out by Marx.
The General Linkage:
Marxism, following Hegel, insists on considering nature as a whole in which
things and events are linked together organically and are dependent on one
another. No thing or event makes sense if isolated, as allegedly done by
metaphysics, from other things and events that surround it. Martyr al-Sadr
denies this allegation. Metaphysics considers the world as completely
interlinked in accordance with the law of causality. The novelty introduced by
the Marxist dialectic lies not in the general linkage itself but in its
application to political aims.
However, two points are noteworthy in regard to the view of the theory of
general linkage held by metaphysics. First, the linkage of every part of the
universe to the causes, conditions and circumstances relevant to it does not
mean that one cannot notice or define it in an independent manner. Second, the
causal linkage among the parts of nature cannot be circular.
Here, at the close of al-Sadr's refutation of the dialectics, which was an
attempt, albeit an unsuccessful one, to understand and interpret historical
change and indeed to bring it about it is essential to point out that
traditional Islamic philosophy as well historiography have not paid adequate
attention to historical change, which is a kind of 'macro-change' that reveals
itself over extended ages and eras of time. Western philosophy and science, at
least since Hegel and Darwin, have been keenly cognizant of historical change
and development and have tried to see beyond the immediate panorama of
micro-changes of all sorts: physical, chemical, biological, social, economic,
political and cultural.
Although al-Sadr insists that traditional metaphysics has not been blind to
change, he himself gives no clear indication of the recognition which is due to
macro-changes. One of the most significant characteristics of modem science is
its attention to change that lies behind the veils of permanence in the
universe. This historical awareness is now common to all the disciplines which
have to deal with the past from astronomy, geology and biology to sociology,
history, anthropology, and the historical study of art, technology, religion,
politics, language and ideas.
The Principle of Causality:
The law of causality, al-Sadr states, is a necessary rational principle present
in the core of man's nature as a rational being. It is on the basis of this
principle that (1) the objective reality of sense perception, (2) the validity
of scientific theories and laws based on experimentation and (3) the validity of
all philosophical and scientific inference, are based.
Al-Sadr explains that although the objective existence of the world is a
necessary primary judgement that requires no evidence, the objective reality of
every particular sense perception is not known in a necessary manner. It is on
the basis of the principle of causality that a specific perception, under
specific circumstances and conditions, reveals the existence of its cause as an
external object.
Experimental theories do not acquire a scientific character unless they are
generalized beyond the limits of particular experiments. And this is not
possible without reliance on general causal laws which are: (1) the principle
that every event has a cause, (2) the principle that every cause necessarily
produces its effect, and (3) the principle of harmony between causes and
effects.
Without the laws of causality, there would not be any link between evidence and
conclusions and no evidence would lead to any result.
Even those who attempt to deny this principle by resorting to a certain evidence
would not make this attempt had they not believed that the evidence on which
they rely is a sufficient cause of the knowledge of the falsity of this
principle. But this is in itself an application of this principle.
It is wrong to regard the principle of causality as an inductive law based on
experimentation, because such a view reopens the fundamental question about the
validity of perception and experimentation, to which no answer can be found. It
is a principle which is accepted independently of the senses and is above
experimentation. From the viewpoint of Islamic philosophers, (1) causality is
not limited to the natural phenomena which figure in experimentation, but is a
general law of existence, applicable to the material and the immaterial; (2) the
cause whose existence is confirmed by this principle need not be subject to
experimentation, nor it need be of a material nature; (3) the fact that
experimentation does not disclose a specific cause of a certain phenomenon does
not imply a failure on the part of this principle, for it does not rest on
experimentation. These salient points differentiate the mechanistic,
materialistic interpretation of the law of causality from its theological
interpretation.
Causality and Microphysics:
Inevitable uncertainty entered the realm of modern physics as a result of
experimentation with subatomic particles. If the position of an electron were to
be accurately measured, radiations of very small wavelength would have to be
used for the determination. But such radiations possess quanta of high energy,
and would alter the momentum and energy of the electron by impact. Similarly, to
measure the momentum of an electron, quanta of low energy would have to be used.
The wavelengths of such quanta being large, the position of the electron would
be correspondingly indeterminate. Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty followed
from the wave-particle duality of matter and radiation, and from the fact that
the characteristics of objects were usually unavoidably altered during the
course of experimentation.
The indeterminacy at the subatomic level meant that there could be only
probabilistic knowledge of subatomic events. This fact made the physicists and
erroneously according to al-Sadr abandon belief in the universality of the
principle of causality. Not only that, they came to interpret the causal fixity
and regularity of macroscopic events as a statistical phenomenon, analogous to
the stability of, say, suicide rates.
Al-Sadr points out that the doubts raised by scientists in microphysics are
based on a specific notion of the principle of causality different from the
notion of it held by Muslim philosophers. According to the latter notion, the
principle is not based on experimental evidence and stands above
experimentation. Moreover, the limits of experiment prove only our inability to
apply it in some fields, not the invalidity of this principle in those fields.
In addition, microphysical experiments do not offer any scientific evidence
proving the falsity of the principle of causality in the field of subatomic
physics. The introduction of indeterminacy is a problem of the observing
subject, something which does not warrant the elimination of causal laws from
the universe.
The Meaning of Causality:
Al-Sadr states that there are four theories which resulted from attempts to
answer the question: Why do things require causes?
(1) The first theory, adopted by some Marxist theoreticians, states that an
existent requires a cause for its existence. According to it, causality is a
general law of existence as confirmed by scientific experiments. To regard the
law of causality as an inductive principle, al-Sadr points out again, is an
error. It is not within the scientific possibilities of experiment to indicate
that the secret of the requirement for a cause lies at the heart of existence in
general. The principle of causality is a purely philosophical principle and so
also are the issues concerning it and the theories that treat its limits.
(2) The second theory, which al-Sadr calls "the theory of creation", asserts
that things need causes for coming into existence. Thus if a thing exists
continuously and always and has not come into being after not having existed,
there will be no need in it for a cause, nor will it enter the realm of
causality. While the first theory goes too far in generalizing causality, the
second theory goes too far in restricting it.
(3) & (4) The other two are the theories of "essential possibility" and
"existential possibility". These two theories assert that what makes things need
their causes is possibility. They differ from each other due to their different
notions of possibility, which relate to a difference regarding quiddity and
existence. Since a discussion of this difference lies outside the scope of the
book, al-Sadr limits himself to the discussion of the theory of existential
possibility, advanced by Mulla Sadra, which asserts the fundamentality of
existence.
According to this theory, causality is a relation between two existences: the
cause and the effect. If, for example, B is an effect of A, does B have an
existence independent of A? The answer is in the negative. Causality requires
that the effect does not have a reality prior to its link with its cause;
otherwise, it will not be an effect. Moreover, B is not something that has a
link or relation to the cause; rather it is the very linkage, in the sense that
its being and existence become a conjunctive being and relational existence. The
discontinuity of its linkage to its cause means destruction of it and an end of
its being, for its being is represented in that linkage. A relational entity
cannot be detached from the thing to which it is essentially linked or related.
Moreover, all being is not governed by the principle of causality. Rather, this
principle governs the relational existents, whose reality embodies linkage and
relation.
Here Martyr al-Sadr points out that the Marxists fluctuate between the
dialectical model and causality while explaining phenomena. That is, while they
regard internal contradiction as a sufficient explanation of every phenomenon in
the universe, they also take recourse now and then to the cause-effect relation
for explaining some phenomena by external causes. A relevant caw is the Marxist
assertion that the means of production make up the social infrastructure,
whereas all other aspects of society, including the intellectual and political
conditions, the considered superstructural. This means that the relation between
the superstructure and the means of production is a cause-effect relation. Here,
there is no contradiction but causality.
Contemporaneity Between Cause and Effect:
Since the existence of the effect is essentially linked to the existence of the
cause, the cause is necessary for the effect and the effect must be
contemporaneous with the cause so that its being and existence the linked to
that cause. This is the law of contemporaneity between the cause and the effect.
Two arguments were forwarded to prove that it is possible for the effect to
continue after its cause ceases to exist.
(1) The first argument, put forward by theologians, rests on two idea. The first
is that things need causes in order to come into existence; after its coming
into being, a thing has no need for a cause.
However, as pointed out earlier, a thing's need for a cause is not for its
coming into existence, but because its existence is essentially linked to its
specific cause.
The second notion is that the law of contemporaneity between the cause and the
effect is not consistent with a certain group of phenomena in the universe. For
example, a building erected by builders continues to exist even after all of
them are gone and are no more alive. Al-Sadr states that in all such examples,
the error lies in identifying the real causes.
(2) The other theory, suggested by the modem science of mechanics, assert that
in the light of the laws of motion continuity of motion does not require a
cause. According to the first law of motion, a body continues to move with a
uniform velocity in a straight line, after an impulse is imparted to it, unless
disturbed by an external force.
According to al-Sadr such an assertion leads to an immediate cancellation of the
principle of causality. If it were possible for motion to continue without a
cause, then it would also be possible for it to occur without a cause and for
things to begin existing without a cause.
The reason is that continuity of motion always involves a new coming into
existence.
According to al-Sadr, the experiments which suggest the first law of motion do
not actually show that the external force is cause of motion. It is possible, he
says, that the real cause of ethereal is something that had existed all along;
external causes act the force within the body and prepare it as cause (Muslim
have believed that all accidental motion, including the mechanical motion of
bodies, is produced by a force within bodies). As a result, al-Sadr finds the
law of inertia to be incompatible with the law of causality.
It is amazing that the author should consider the first law of motion as
incompatible with the principle of causality. But that is because he, in the
tradition of Mulla Sadra, considers motion as a continual renewal of existence,
a continual recreation. Mechanics, on the other hand, considers rest as well as
uniform motion in a straight line as unchanged states. Only acceleration is
considered a change of state that requires an external cause or force. Also,
Mulla Sadra considers circular motion as the most perfect kind of motion (and,
it may be remarked, such a conception of motion can have unfortunate
consequences for any civilization that adopts it). There is no reason why simple
mechanical motion should necessarily be considered a continual renewal of
existence and no reason why the first law of motion should be logically
incompatible with the principle of causality.
One wishes that al-Sadr had treated some concepts of traditional Muslim
philosophy with the same critical scrutiny with which he treats the dialectics.
It is the view of some historians of science that certain misconceptions about
motion inherited by Muslim philosophy and science from Aristotle were
responsible for the failure of Muslim scientists to develop the science of
mechanics, which was developed by the West only after it discarded the
misconceptions of Greek philosophy regarding motion.
On the whole, it may bestated that the arguments advanced by the author in
favour of contemporaneity of cause and effect are not very convincing. At the
end of the chapter he draws a theological conclusion from the above discussion.
The causal chain which relates relational entities cannot be infinite or
circular; for in that case all the parts of the chain will be effects. Hence the
world proceeds from a being necessary in essence, self-sufficient and not
requiring a cause. Every cause except the first cause is a cause-effect, and
hence needs a cause.
The first cause, being a pure cause, does not require a cause prior to it, for a
thing does not require a cause qua cause but as an effect qua effect.
Matter or God?
The question dealt with in this chapter is whether the first cause of existence
is matter or something transcending it. This is the ultimate issue in the
conflict between theological philosophy and materialism.
The dialectic is but an unsuccessful attempt of materialism to unite the
efficient cause and the material cause of the world, in accordance with the laws
of dialectical contradiction.
Al-Sadr briefly recapitulates the development of the scientific study of matter
from Greek thought to the twentieth-century atomic physics.
Modern physics discovered that energy is the substratum of the world and matter
is a state of energy. In the light of these discoveries the quality of
materiality itself becomes an accidental quality.
The philosophical conclusion that follows from this is that it is not possible
to regard matter as the first cause of the world. Moreover, science has
established that there is one kind of matter that underlies all the various
elements, compounds, substances and things. But how can a single reality be the
cause of different and contradictory manifestations? According to al-Sadr such a
thing is not possible. Hence matter cannot be the efficient cause of the world,
as the world is full of different and multifarious phenomena.
Furthermore, the properties or qualities that matter manifests in the various
spheres of its existence are accidental to the primary reality of matter.
Further, the property of materiality itself is also accidental. Hence, raw
matter, which all things share, cannot be an essential cause of those properties
or qualities.
Al-Sadr points out that the method followed by theology for demonstrating the
necessity of an efficient cause of the world is the same as that followed by
experimental science for explaining empirical phenomena. He does not fail to
point out here that the dialectic with its theory of contradictions is able to
account neither for the progression of the elements in the atomic table nor for
the formation of chemical compounds.
Matter and Philosophy.
The above discussion related to the necessity of the efficient cause of the
world in relation to matter as conceived by science. Thereafter, al-Sadr
proposes to examine the question in the light of the philosophical conception of
matter. By 'philosophical matter' he means the most primary matter of the world,
whether or not experimental science is able to posit it. Philosophical matter is
matter simpler than scientific matter and has a form. Its existence can be
demonstrated philosophically.
Atomic physics posited Democritean atomism, the theory that bodies are not
continuous and are composed of minute atoms. But there is a philosophical side
to the Democritean theory which is rejected by philosophy. Philosophically,
according to al-Sadr, the unit of matter posited by science must be continuous,
for it cannot be a real unit without internal continuity. At the same time, on
account of its continuity, it should be capable of division and separation. That
is, the unit must have a simple matter which is receptive to division and
separation. Matter, therefore, is that which is receptive to division and
separation, which are destructive of unity. Philosophically, it is not possible
to conceive a unit without the receptivity to division, regardless of the
ability of scientific tools and methods to affect such a division. The discovery
of the so-called fundamental particles as the primary units of matter does not
settle the question as to whether or not they are receptive to division.
When the philosophical conception of matter, as something composed of matter and
form is understood, we know, according to al-Sadr, that philosophical matter
cannot be the first cause of the world.
Matter and Motion:
Matter is in continuous motion and constant development. Can the same thing be
simultaneously a subject of motion and a cause of it?
Metaphysics insists on the multiplicity of the mover and the moved, because
motion (i.e. growth) is a gradual development and completion of a deficient
thing. A deficient thing cannot be the cause of its own completion. In the light
of this, the cause of developmental motion is not matter itself, but a cause
transcending matter that imparts to matter linear motion and gradual
development. Here it should be noted that al-Sadr does not attempt to
distinguish between different kinds of motion, such as simple mechanical motion
and organic growth.
Dialectical materialism, on the contrary, does not recognize this duality
between the mover and the moved, and considers matter itself as the cause of its
motion and development. From the viewpoint of theology, there are no actual
contradictions contained in matter. The internal content of matter is empty of
everything except receptivity and capacity. Motion is a gradual departure from
potentiality to actuality. Matter is not the cause of motion, for it is devoid
of the levels of completion attained in the various stages of development. It
is, therefore, necessary to search for the cause of the substantial motion of
matter outside its limits. It is also necessary that this cause be God, the
Exalted, Who encompasses essentially all the ranks of completion and perfection.
Al-Sadr then calls our attention to the digestive and circulatory systems which
provide proper nutrients to every one of the billions of cells in the body. In
the same way, he calls attention to the eye and the apparatus of vision as a
proof of the design of a supreme intelligence.
He points out that experimental biology has failed to explain the origin of life
upon the earth. He asks whether the astonishing work of the genes, which control
the character of every cell and bestow particular traits to an organism, could
be products of haphazard chance. He discusses various theories of animal
instinct and finds all of them in- adequate in explaining the wonderful
behaviour of the bee, the shark, the ant, the hen and the eel. The only adequate
explanation is that instinctive behaviour is the result of a mysterious, divine,
supernatural inspiration. The marvellous order underlying nature bears testimony
to the presence of an omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent intelligence.
The Nature of Knowledge:
The most important issue of epistemology, according to al-Sadr, is the one
concerning the reality of knowledge: Is knowledge a material or an immaterial
phenomenon? Marxism asserts that knowledge and thought are material, organic
processes of the brain.
Scientific exploration of the processes of sensation and consciousness has
revealed beyond doubt that there are physical, chemical and physiological events
involved in the functioning of the sense organs and the nervous system. However,
these findings do not prove that perception, knowledge, thought and
consciousness are material processes and that mind is grounded in matter. Such
an assertion about the reality of the mind lies outside the scope of
experimental science. Similarly, psychology, either through introspection or
objective observation, studies psychological phenomena; but the nature of
knowledge and the reality of the mind are questions that have to be dealt by the
philosophy of mind.
Al-Sadr takes up the nature of the perceived image in visual perception as an
example to argue in favour of the immateriality of the mind.
When we enter a vast garden extending for thousands of meters, at a glance we
perceive its extent together with most of the trees and objects that are in it.
Is the image of the garden that we grasp a material? It is, according to
materialism. It image existing in a part of our brain is not, according to the
metaphysical view; it is a metaphysical entity outside the realm of the material
world. It is true that the light rays form an image on the retina, and this
image is transferred in some form to the brain. Nevertheless, the image
transferred to the brain is other than the mental image. Al-Sadr offers two
reasons for believing so.
Firstly, he states, the mental image does not have the same "geometrical
properties" as those of the material image transferred to the brain, because the
former resembles the garden in extent, form and geometric properties, whereas
the brain and its image are small and the imprinting of a large thing on a small
thing is impossible. Therefore, it must be an immaterial image.
Secondly, the mental image is inclined to stability and does not change in
accordance with the changes of the image reflected in the nervous system. What
al-Sadr means by the 'stability' of the mental image is this: If, for example, 1
place a pencil at a distance of one meter from me it will form an image of a
specific size on the retina. If this distance is doubled, the retinal image
would be reduced in size accordingly. However, al-Sadr claims, in spite of this
reduction in the size of the retinal image, the mental image we have of the
pencil remains stable in size. This also proves, according to him, that the
mental image is immaterial.
Both of the above arguments offered by al-Sadr appear to be invalid. In the
first argument, the actual size of the mental image is assumed to be the same as
that of the viewed object (garden, in the example). However, when one is inside
a room, the visual field presents a part of the room; when viewing a landscape,
it covers a much wider space consisting of near and distant objects. When
viewing the sky at night, the same visual field presents stars located at
astronomical distances. It is not logical to claim that the mental image assumes
the extent of the room in the first case, the extent of the landscape in the
second, and the extent of the Milky Way in the third. That the second argument
is invalid will be revealed by a simple visual experiment. Every student of
drawing familiar with the laws of perspective knows that objects of similar size
should be drawn on a scale proportional to their distance of location. The
'stability' of size, referred to by al-Sadr, is simply an illusion.
However, the failure of these arguments does not mean that the philosophical
position asserting the immateriality of the mind is indefensible. An argument
that may be offered in favour of this position is the following. If we assume
the contents of the mind to be material, then it can be said that the mind
should be in direct contact with the fundamental reality of matter when
perceiving the data of the senses, as well as while experiencing any of its
phenomena, such as thoughts, dreams, feelings, emotions, and everything else
that enters the consciousness. That is, the fundamental reality of matter must
be the object of the mind's direct experience if its phenomena are of a material
nature. However, we see that we do not come across any molecules, atoms or
sub-atomic particles, which are what matter is composed of according to science,
in any sphere of our consciousness. Moreover, it is believed that the reality of
matter is one, while the phenomena that manifest themselves in consciousness are
fundamentally various. The data of the senses smells, tactual impressions,
impressions of taste, sounds, colours are fundamentally of a different nature
from one another. Further, perceived impressions of each class are different
from imagined, dreamt, or recalled impressions of that class. Again, all the
impressions of the senses are fundamentally different from thoughts.
None of them can be imagined as being reducible into another, nor all of them
can be reducible to any single substratum called matter.
Furthermore, each of the impressions of the senses, and so also thoughts, are
fundamental realities experienced by the mind. They are signs and images in that
they represent something other than themselves, but in themselves they are
things in that they are what they are. Material objects are represented by them
in that they are images; but nothing that we know about matter enters their
actual constitution as things.
Now, going back to al-Sadr's discourse, if there are two sides to a human being,
one spiritual or immaterial and the other material and physical, how do the two
sides constantly affect each other? Plato was unable to bridge the gulf between
the soul and the body. Descartes' theory of parallelism denied that there was
any causal relation between physical and mental events, and hence admitted an
unbridgeable gulf between the body and the mind. This failure leads to the
crystallization of the inclination in European philosophy to explain man's being
on the basis of one principle, matter or mind, leading to the opposite
tendencies of materialism and idealism.
In the Islamic world, the explanation of human being on the basis of two
principles, spiritual and material, found its most convincing formulation in the
thought of Sadr al-Muta'allihin or Mulla Sadra.
According to Mulla Sadra, movement does not occur only in the accidents, but
goes on in the substances and in the core of the being of things. He called it
al-harakat al-jawhariyyah, substantial movement.
According to his theory, matter in its substantial movement pursues the
completing of its existence until it assumes an immaterial being, becoming free
from all materiality. Thus, there remains no dividing line between spirituality
and materiality. Rather, they are two levels of existence. in spite of the fact
that the soul is not material, yet it has material relations, because it is the
highest stage of the completion of matter in its substantial movement. The
difference between materiality and spirituality is just a matter of degree.
However, it does not mean that the soul is a product of matter and one of its
effects. Rather, it is a product of substantial movement, which does not proceed
from matter itself. The reason is that every movement is a gradual emergence of
a thing from potentiality to actuality. Potentiality cannot bring about
actuality, and possibility cannot bring about existence. Therefore, substantial
movement has its cause outside matter. The soul is a product of this movement,
which itself is the bridge between materiality and spirituality.
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