The killing of Sayed Mustafa Kazimi, the 45-year-old Hazara Shi'ite leader
from Parwan province of Afghanistan, to the northwest of Kabul, bears all the
hallmark of a political assassination.
The blame for the suicide bomb attack on Tuesday in the town of Pul-i-Khumri in
the northern Baghlan province, some 150 kilometers from Kabul, will almost
inevitably be placed at the doorstep of the Taliban. This is only natural. The
denial of involvement by the main Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahed, is
unlikely to be taken seriously.
But the incident once again draws attention to the problem that under the guise
of the Taliban insurgency, many forces are operating.
The incident also catches attention as the deadliest suicide attack since the
overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. According to initial reports, close to
50 people were killed, including five members of Parliament, including Kazimi.
An 18-member delegation of lawmakers was visiting a sugar factory in Baghlan
when the attack took place.
Kazimi appears to have been the main target. He was the rising star of the
Afghan political scene. Foreigners who knew him in the heyday of the
anti-Taliban resistance in the 1990s would vouchsafe that he was destined to
rise high in the political arena. His mujahideen pedigree was impeccable. He was
relatively young and had a modern outlook.
Along with "Ustad" Abdul Ali Mazari and Karim Khalili, he was one of the
founders of the Hizb-e-Wahdat Islami Afghanistan, the main Hazara Shi'ite
mujahideen group, which was supported by Iran in the Afghan jihad of the 1980s
against the Soviet Union.
Kazimi was a rare combination of brilliant organizer and suave spokesman. For
his community, which was traditionally bereft of such talented leaders, he was a
great asset. It came as no surprise that when the so-called National United
Front, Jabhe-ye-Motahed-e-Milli, an assorted coalition of erstwhile mujahideen
leaders (and former communists) in political opposition to the government of
President Hamid Karzai took shape in March, Kazimi was appointed its main
spokesman.
Kazimi's role in the National United Front was tacit recognition of his
consistent stance that Afghan politics must cross ethnic and regional
boundaries. In the exasperating internecine tensions within the anti-Taliban
Northern Alliance in the late 1990s, Kazimi often played a key role, bridging
ethnic, personal rivalries among various groups.
But for Kazimi's tireless role, it is doubtful if rapprochement between the
Tajik groups led by the late Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Hezb-e-Wahdat would have
been possible within the framework of the Northern Alliance. The mutual
antipathies of the two sides were well-founded as Tajik forces had killed about
1,000 Hazara women and children in a massacre in the west Kabul district of
Afshar, a predominantly Hazara area, during the mujahideen rule in 1993.
Kazimi had an easy way of working with political adversaries, which is uncommon
in Afghanistan.
Evidently, those who plotted his assassination had a grand design. The Taliban
lack the political sophistication to work with such foresight and planning. Of
course, the Taliban have an old feud with the Hazara Shi'ites dating to the
murder of Mazari in March 1995, when the Taliban, already approaching Kabul,
entrapped him after inviting him for peace talks. He was tortured and murdered
before his body was thrown out of a helicopter somewhere near Ghazni.
Observers of the Afghan scene may have forgotten the incident, but what comes
readily to mind is that the suspicion still lingers that Mazari's murder was the
handiwork of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
The finger of suspicion will once again turn to the ISI and its accomplices over
Kazimi's killing, which raises the issue of what would be gained by removing him
from the political landscape.
First, he comes from a region of Afghanistan which is very sensitive. Those who
know the Afghan chessboard would acknowledge the supreme importance of
controlling the provinces of Baghlan and Parwan. They form the gateway to the
northern Amu Darya region, the Panjshir Valley to the east and the central
Hazarajat region respectively.
Control of the mountain passes to the west of Baghlan was bitterly contested
between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. The hub was extremely important
strategically. In political terms, it is possible to say that without exercising
control of the hub, there can be no effective unity between the non-Pashtun
ethnic groups of Tajiks and Hazaras (and even the Uzbekis).
Baghlan connects the predominantly Tajik areas with the Hazarajat region and is
also on the main communication line between Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif in the Amu
Darya region. Baghlan itself is a mosaic where Pushtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras have
traditionally vied for influence and control.
Kazimi hailed from Parwan and did much of his political work in his early years
in Baghlan province, where he was quite popular. There is no better way of
creating volatility, if not mayhem, in that sensitive region than through a
political assassination.
Kazimi's killing is a tell-tale sign that a master plan to destabilize the
northern regions of Afghanistan is in the works. It could only mean that we are
about to witness the calibrated extension of the insurgency to the northern
regions, which have remained relatively tranquil, apart from a few sporadic
incidents.
The implications could be very serious for the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) contingents located thinly on the ground in the northern
regions.
Kazimi's killing throws the National United Front into confusion. This is
unfortunate since it was a coalition of non-Taliban opposition elements. In any
future "intra-Afghan dialogue", the coalition would have optimized its
bargaining strength simply by being a collective body. Kazimi would have been
vital glue for the disparate elements of the front to be able to collectively
bargain for political space in any future set-up in Kabul that strove to
accommodate the Taliban.
There are already signs that elements within the National United Front have
begun seeking accommodation at the individual level. The weakening of the front
at this stage, just as there are signs of talks with the Taliban gaining a
formal shape, works entirely to the advantage of the Taliban.
And the Hezb-e-Wahdat takes a devastating blow with Kazimi's death. His absence
will be keenly felt in protecting Hazara interests. Tehran, too, has lost a good
Afghan friend, raising more questions about the identity and motives of those
who carried out the attack on Tuesday.
The probability is that Tuesday's attack was staged by the Hezb-i-Islami under
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, which has close ties with the ISI. Hekmatyar has pockets of
influence in the Baghlan area. His field commanders were active in the area even
after he fled Afghanistan in 1996 following the fall of Kabul to the Taliban.
NATO forces in Afghanistan face the spectre of multiple fronts. There are
disquieting signs already. So far the insurgency has been concentrated in the
southern region.
On Tuesday, in what could be a harbinger of events to come, a few dozen Taliban
riding motorcycles and pick-up trucks overran the district center of Kajran in
central Daikundi province, which borders the volatile provinces of Uruzgan and
Helmand, the scene of heavy fighting this year. The attack was preceded by
artillery firing into the town from a mountain overlook for the past five days.
This is the third district overrun by the Taliban outside of the southern region
in the past week. On Monday, the Taliban seized control of Gilistan and Bakwa
provinces in western Farah province near the Iranian border.
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