If the US proceeds on the basis of the conviction that, after its failure in
Iraq and Afghanistan, it needs to score a success in Lebanon by rolling back the
opposition through the application of international resolutions, and another
success in Palestine by feeding the West Bank and starving Gaza in the hope of
compelling the Palestinians to accept anything Israel offers, the only thing it
will accomplish will be to propel these two countries to civil war and
destruction.
For America's friends and allies in these countries, this is their moment to
shine. If they have an ounce of patriotism, they should be able to picture the
possibility of national reconciliation and agreements that will spare their
countries death and devastation. They can give the Americans some sound advice.
They can tell them that no amount of outside support or money will resolve the
domestic conflict, that a Hamas desperate enough to initiate resistance in the
West Bank, for example, will frustrate the projects dreamed up by various
research institutes for a Western-financed social safety net to take the place
of the Hamas- run philanthropic societies along with all the economic
initiatives conceived in the course of a businessmen's convention in Tel Aviv.
They can say that only national reconciliation will work, that local balances of
power are one thing and the balance of power in the Security Council another,
and that forcing the former to mirror the latter has only succeeded in
inflicting on the region an endless train of disasters.
Of course, as useful as this advice is, one pretty much has to don rose-tinted
lenses to believe that those friends and allies of America will offer it to
Washington; indeed, lenses of a more hallucinogenic quality if those people
think that there is still time to turn an impetuous America under the yolk of a
reckless president to the advantage of their domestic agendas. Naturally, too,
we did not mention here the need for Syria and Iran's friends and allies in
these countries to whisper similar advice to Damascus and Tehran, since they
have already declared their position with regard to the need for national
reconciliation in Palestine and national unity in Lebanon.
It had long been an Arab custom to point the finger abroad or at "certain
elements" in order to avert rupture between them. In the post- independence
phase, from the time when coups stopped and regimes settled down, until the
alienation of the Saddam Hussein regime following the war to liberate Kuwait,
there was something of an unwritten agreement between Arab regimes to keep their
mutual acrimony from exceeding the bounds of their collective interest and the
preservation of stability. Directing blame away from each other was the way to
do this. So when they cried out in unison against the "imperialist, Zionist and
Arab reactionary" conspiracy, as though it were a three-headed monster, and held
this trinity responsible for the latest outbreak of fighting inside Palestine or
the latest resumption of gunfire in the backstreets of Beirut, no one blinked an
eye. Even Israel shrugged off the accusation and fell in with the universal
pretence that this was a form of revolutionary bombast and the Arab regimes' way
of sweeping their problems under the carpet.
But the phenomenon goes much further back. It dates at least to the Sykes-Picot
Agreement, which ordained that there could be no Arab nationalist concern and
that domestic conflicts in the Arab world had to reflect or play a part in
international conflicts. So when, in that twilight of the Ottoman era, Arab
political forces were ranged as for or against the Great Powers and other
outside powers, the local categorisers with grudges to bear against certain
national forces made no distinction between these, some of which had sided with
this or that of the outside powers for various reasons of their own, and actual
security breaches, which is to say individuals that were actively acting on
behalf of, or conspiring with those powers. Either one was an "Arab in spite of
all else," and therefore part of that great Arab family that was summoned to
unite against colonialism, or one was a "proxy" or a "spy".
It is not my concern, here, to define who might be categorised as a security
breach or an "agent" working on behalf of a foreign power. Suffice it to say
that the concept could extend to those individuals we read about in books
produced by former US officials (such as Ross and Tenet); individuals who proved
to have had a hand in the American decision-making process if only because they
were a source of information -- very carefully selected information, it should
be added, furnished to the US on the eve of the war against Iraq to show that
the Saddam regime was ripe for the plucking, or on the eve of Camp David II to
show that Yasser Arafat was ready to accept anything on offer as long as Bill
Clinton could work his magic charm. It goes without saying that such information
had very disastrous consequences.
What does concern me here is those forces that regard it in their interests to
ally themselves with the US and that are currently studying the possibility of
an alliance with Israel. These we cannot categorise as a "security breach"
because they represent the interests and attitudes of the regime and even some
relatively narrow social strata. It is too easy to pass these off as weak or
pretending to be weak, or stupid or easily gulled. Such assessments are
simplistic and will inevitably lead to folly. The Arab world has a whole new
generation of politicians that subscribe to the concept of the sub-regional
nation state and the need to place its interests (most often as identified with
the interests of the existing regime) above all other considerations. To them,
if that requires an alliance with the US, even at the expense of that nation's
relations with other Arab countries, then so be it. The Palestinian cause, in
their opinion, is simply another national issue, as opposed to an Arab national
issue. The Arabs have to help resolve this problem, of course. But a just
solution is not necessarily required, not when that problem continues to form a
source of trouble and potential instability, because it constantly arms domestic
opposition forces with fodder to sustain their anger against the regime and
their resentment of its alliance with the West and of never-ending attempts to
delegitimise supranational frames of reference such as pan-Arabism or Islam.
Some Arab democrats, especially those with a history of leftist leanings, had
pinned their hopes on US interventionism in the name of democratic reform. How
deluded they were. Whatever immunity they once had has been swept away by an
imperialist policy that they helped to usher in through their strident hostility
even towards those modernist elements in Arab nationalism that they equated with
prevailing regimes. I suppose they were always this way. In the past they fell
into the thrall of the international revolution. More recently they were
captivated by globalised democracy. In both cases, outside power always held the
key.
But these are not the ones I have in mind when I speak of forces currently
allied with the US. Rather, I am talking about various rulers and their coteries
of relatives, friends, nouveaux superrich businessmen and "neo-liberal"
intellectuals. These have never been anywhere near the left and they never had a
warm spot in their hearts for democracy, civil rights and liberalism. Liberalism
to them means economic privatisation and deregulation to feed their small circle
of the rich and privileged, which is a far cry from what even economic
liberalism is supposed to be about. Sadly, this is the only policy that is
systematically succeeding amidst the devastation in Iraq. Whereas in the past
one pondered such alternatives as democracy, dictatorship and monarchy, today
the Arab world should add a new term to its political glossary: "kleptocracy",
or rule by a gang of thieves.
These neo-liberal kleptocrats are not puppets on strings; they have become the
strongest component in Washington's equations for the Middle East in the wake of
its intervention in Iraq. So dependent has the US become on them that it has
long since removed the sword of democratisation and political reform from over
their heads. They pursue their own agendas and, right now, are working to secure
the might of the world's superpower towards the advancement of these agendas,
domestically and regionally. And they have their own way of looking at things,
which generally involves some unrealistic perception, founded upon smatterings
of selective information digested through a maze of prejudice and hand-me- down
slogans, of the old Arab order, and upon the media-fed impression that Israel is
ready to make peace and the equally propagandistic notion that Arabs had better
not let another opportunity slip by.
At some point in the recent past, such concepts as "the battle of Arabism" and
the Arab "fight for survival" against Israel have become objects of derision, a
kind of adolescent joke among teenagers who have just discovered the signs of
puberty and who already show signs of never being able to grow up. The fact is,
however, that these were not airy slogans but rather the substance of an actual
phase in Arab perception of a peril that is now looming closer than ever. This
understanding has eluded those to whom "national liberation" was never more than
a slogan, who tout the pragmatism of any settlement with Israel at all, and who
blame the Palestinians for holding this up. Regretfully, their reading of
reality, their knowledge of Israel as based on this reading, and their total
dependence on Israel's good intentions, has only worked to whet Israel's
appetite for extorting more. Their take on reality lets them operate on the
assumption that the US is prepared to use its influence to get Israel to back
down and that Israel is eager to help them save face when needed. It is a take
that is certainly not founded on facts, but then facts and information are not
this generation's forte. Indeed, I would suggest that the generation of Gamal
Abdel-Nasser and the old Baathists were far more informed, far more realistic,
and immeasurably less corrupt.
Certain significant Arab quarters are not only happy to be free from US
pressures at a time when they are needed to confront opponents to a fictitious
peace process; they also relish in the opportunity to lash out at that Arab camp
that does not share their assessment of reality and the opinions they espouse
accordingly. So their opinion pundits sound the alarm against the "Shia
crescent," regardless of the facts and, most likely, indifferent to the truth.
Others, at the moment, are taking jabs at Damascus, whose rhetoric about Syria's
capabilities and regional role has become a little too much to bear. Syria
really must learn its place. It's perfectly okay to want the Golan Heights back,
but only so long as Syria neo- liberalises its economy (in the kleptocratic
sense, of course). Then they will stand behind Syria, just as they are standing
behind the Palestinian leadership after its disengagement from Hamas, and they
will help it accomplish both objectives. But if Syria, for a moment, forgets
that it has no role to play in Iraq, Lebanon or Palestine, and if it does not
transform itself into the type of country that wants to solve its border dispute
with Israel, then it will have to be isolated and given a couple of tough
lessons. I have no doubt that these quarters are, at this very moment,
whispering some very urgent advice into Washington's ear about Syria, just as
they had about how to deal with Iraq and how to deal with Arafat.
I would even bet that someone from these quarters volunteered to explain to
Condoleezza Rice the story about Syrian-Iranian differences and that she went
from there to build a rosy scenario of a complete fall out between the two
countries. No doubt too, someone suggested turning off the food, medicine and
fuel taps in Gaza, so as to keep Hamas busy supplying Palestinians there with
their most essential needs, while showering the West Bank with aid and West Bank
leaders with privileges in order to demonstrate the advantages of negotiating
over declarations of principle.
But if I were these people, or at least those who listen to them, I would take
care. For some reason it always transpires that their analyses, such as they
are, are founded on scattered evidence and impressions tailored to suit the
hypothesis. And just as Iraq failed to turn into an American satellite and
friend of Israel, and just as Hizbullah refused to back down before Israel, so
too will such daydreams as the collapse of the Syrian regime turn into fresh
nightmares. Nor do I have a shadow of doubt that the only way to avert more
nightmares in Lebanon and Palestine is for people there to set their minds on
national reconciliation and to resolve their domestic differences.
Source: Al-Ahram Weekly
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