In light of the latest news regarding Iran's rapid advances in nuclear
centrifuge technology and Tehran's warning that it will reject any new UN
measures aimed at halting its nuclear progress, it's clear that Iran's nuclear
standoff has entered a new phase - one that may have global consequences and
cause irreparable harm to the pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The connection between the two issues has been presented in a different light by
Western pundits who have maintained that the NPT will deteriorate in the absence
of effective action to counter the Iranian "proliferation activities". Foremost
among such pundits is a former official of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), Pierre Goldschmidt, who has called for proactive initiatives by
the UN Security Council to address proliferation risks often attributed to "NPT
loopholes".
Of course, first among the "loopholes" is the right to produce nuclear fuel
under Article IV of the NPT. In the words of IAEA chief Mohammad ElBaradei, this
means that the non-nuclear weapons nations exercising nuclear power would become
"virtual nuclear weapon states". The gap between "virtual" and "actual" can be
rather wide, however, and may remain so as long as a robust verification and
inspection regime remains in place.
But the problem with proposals of Goldschmidt and other like-minded experts is
that they introduce new and potentially larger problems, particularly with
respect to the relatively successful non-proliferation regime. For one thing,
the UN Security Council's attempt to deprive Iran of the capability to produce
nuclear fuel has no legal precedent. Bottom line, this is an anti-NPT initiative
that will only lead to an anarchy in rules and the collapse of norms that other
nuclear proliferators can take advantage of.
So what exactly is the purpose of these abnormal UN initiatives against Iran? Is
it to indirectly weaken the non-proliferation regime, in order to benefit
countries such as Israel that have come under increasing international pressure
to conform to the regime's norms? Or is it exclusively due to the fears of
Iran's proliferation?
Unfortunately, little attention has been given to the various, intended or
unintended, implications of the UN Security Council's actions against Iran,
often under the lame argument that "inaction is not an option". But improper
action is equally, if not additionally, harmful.
Indeed, if the UN Security Council transforms itself into a new de facto arm of
the NPT, should we expect it to do the same for all the other international
regimes - chemical, biological, developmental, disarmament, or otherwise - that
also suffer from various "loopholes" and shortcomings? Clearly, we need a more
norm-guided UN approach toward the Iran nuclear issue, otherwise, the negative
spillover effects on the NPT and a host of other international issues, will soon
be upon us.
Assuming that the IAEA's next report, due out in a few weeks, will bolster
Iran's position that it has not breached any of its international obligations (a
position eloquently reiterated by Iran's envoy to the IAEA, Soltanieh, at a
university in Geneva this week) then the Security Council will have a hard time
rationalizing its sanctions regime, let alone toughening it.
Already, South Africa has put a damper on the current "5 + 1" efforts to pass a
third sanctions resolution on Iran by counseling patience and the need to avoid
rash moves. With the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) solidly behind Iran's nuclear
rights, the coming ElBaradei report on Iran will likely sharpen the tensions at
the UN between the US-led coalition aiming to penalize Iran for defying the UN's
demands and the bulk of the UN's member states defending Iran's rights.
With its plate overflowing with multiple crises - Kenya, Chad, Darfur, Kosovo,
and others - the UN can ill-afford the divisive Iran issue that will polarize
its members if the UN leadership is not careful.
Iran sanctions rollback
By all indications, the initial news from Washington regarding a "5 +1"
consensus on new sanctions against Iran has been premature. New signs of fissure
and disagreement have emerged, suggesting that the draft third sanctions
resolution is in trouble. As a result, expectations are that the drastic
measures stipulated in the draft resolution will be watered down, otherwise it
will not pass and fall prey to the quagmire of diplomatic wrangling.
For their part, Tehran has been emphasizing the "honesty and sincerity" of its
cooperation with the IAEA. A recent article by Iran's foreign minister,
Manouchehr Mottakin, in the British daily The Guardian furthers this emphasis,
as does the fact that this cooperation has extended beyond the Iran-IAEA
protocol and involved "complementary access and information".
In the absence of any evidence of military diversion, the fact that Iran has
already mastered the enrichment technology does not warrant an international
reprisal, particularly from the UN, which has invoked Chapter VII and deemed it
to be an issue of global security and threat to world peace. The US intelligence
report on Iran, confirming that Iran is not presently engaged in a nuclear
weapons program, has undermined the legitimacy of this UN response, and the US
and its allies are now hard-pressed to find viable arguments to justify the
multilateral sanctions regime on Iran.
The argument that Iran's possession of nuclear knowledge is "dangerous",
repeatedly stated by President George W Bush, is undermined by the fact that
Iran has already passed that threshold and that its scientific progress is not
erasable.
Another argument, that Iran's centrifuge activities represent a thinly-veiled
proto-proliferation, also falters by the counter-argument that as long as the
IAEA inspection regime is in place, any diversion would be detected.
A third argument, that Iran has no need for nuclear fuel since Russia has
already provided it with what is needed for its reactors, has been soundly
defended by Iranian nuclear officials who cite past broken promises, the delay
in Russia's completion of Bushehr power plant, and the importance of
technological progress and self-reliance, not to mention the possibility of Iran
entering the lucrative market of nuclear fuel.
In tandem with Iran's cooperation and nuclear transparency, what is needed is a
phasing out of the UN sanctions regime on Iran, instead of strengthening it.
Iran's former foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, who advises the supreme
leader on foreign policy matters, has recently stated the importance of Iran's
diplomatic dialogue with the "5 +1". This signals a growing Iranian willingness
to enter direct dialogue with the US on the nuclear issue.
The US must be prepared to revise its defunct and unrealistic positions on
Iran's nuclear dossier, to focus on transparency and confidence-building
measures pertaining to the various "objective guarantees" that Iran has been
putting on the table for some time. The continuation of the present "coercive"
course of action against Iran by Washington will neither solve the Iran nuclear
crisis nor improve the semi-crisis that the NPT finds itself in today; rather,
it will augment both.
Source: Asia Times
Comments posted are the sole opinion of the author and may not necessarily reflect the opinions of AIM. |
