Once it had ascertained that the Palestinians were solidly split right down
the middle, Israel reverted to its old ways. It dug into its all too familiar
bag of tricks, lies and sleights of hand while sustaining constant prattle about
the need to protect its eternal security and to forefend the threat to its
democracy, which entails subjecting the lands and welfare of other peoples to
its own domestic squabbling, political party rivalries and media sparring. So,
once again, the other side, which had agreed to become the other "party", found
itself sucked into worrying about Israel's internal affairs and the call for
early elections, the identity conflict between Israeli secularists and religious
fanatics, and the national obsession over the soul-wrenching "agony" of having
to suppress and subjugate another people. No other oppressed or occupied people
in the world have ever been forced into such an unnatural, almost "normalized",
concern for the internal concerns of the people who occupied their land and
usurped their national rights.
Purely for the sake of some additional food for thought, we add here that the
Arab spectator (a term that these days is much more apt in the practical and
legal sense than the term "citizen") has recently discovered how rich, diverse
and intricate the domestic issues are in Lebanon. This surprise is mixed with
wonder at the sheer numbers of Lebanese who have something to say and no small
admiration for how eloquently they can go on saying it. But the spectator has
simultaneously discovered that, as far as Lebanon is concerned, this diversity
and these quantities of speakers and words indicate that the strings controlling
Lebanon's fate are being pulled from abroad. This realization places delight at
discovering the outstanding talents of the Lebanese in another context: Israeli
diversity ultimately works to draw outside powers (with the possible exception
of the US) into Israel's internal affairs whereas Lebanese diversity serves to
render Lebanon malleable to deals between outside powers. The contrast is
striking.
In all events, in the midst of negotiations aiming to hammer together some type
of consensus preparatory to the "international peace meeting" this autumn (some
kind of declaration of principles, for example, to be followed by Palestinian
elections that will be portrayed as a Palestinian stamp of approval on this
"internationally" supported declaration of principles), and even as Israelis
relentlessly attempt to "persuade" the Palestinian people of the advantages of
"moderation", Barak made a sudden appearance in a Yediot Aharonot interview.
Without a word of forewarning, he proclaimed that Israel would not withdraw from
the West Bank before another five years because it would take at least that long
to ensure that precautions are in place to fend off Qassam missiles from the
West Bank after withdrawal.
But it is not the substance of this curious intervention that is important -- if
anyone still believes that Israel will withdraw from the West Bank within the
next five years they have only themselves to blame. When Barak called up Rice to
assuage her anger at what she took as a deliberate bid to undermine the
Olmert-Abbas game, he did not retract his statement, but he did reassure her of
his support for the negotiations and for what he termed "the political horizon",
which is another word for the "peace process". Both are from that well-known
Barakian lexicon that harks back to his heyday in Camp David II. It takes
someone who knows the ins and outs of politics in that country to realize that
this is not about political horizons but political shenanigans. Barak is furious
at Olmert for not trusting him and including him in the decision- making and
negotiating processes. It is not just in children's playgrounds that the
ultimatum, "If I can't play, you can't play," applies. At the same time, Barak
is anticipating Olmert's resignation (or forced resignation if he resists)
following the release of the final Winograd report on the war in Lebanon, which
may explicitly ask for the prime minister's resignation and which would bring
the date of elections forward. So Barak is not just lashing out at Olmert; he is
also one-upping Netanyahu, his foremost rival in those elections. Fighting with
the right, in Israel, calls into play another set of rules to those that apply
to rivalries within the Labour Party itself. Also, in preparation for those
elections, Barak is eager to rectify the commonly held impression about him as
the author of unilateral withdrawal, as applied in Lebanon in 2000
(unconditional withdrawal, in other words, in the face of an obdurate Lebanese
resistance and following his failure in negotiations with Syria, which, had they
succeeded, would have purportedly given Israel an honorable exit strategy within
the framework of a peace agreement). So this is what Barak's statement about
Israel not being able to withdraw from the West Bank for another five years was
about.
In reality, the Palestinian negotiator, now "disengaged" from Gaza and Hamas, is
pawn to these and other ugly Israeli games. And he hasn't received anything in
return; Israel has him in its grips with no other Arabs to worry about. It is a
very patient player: it will wring every last drop of advantage it can from his
delight at having been rewarded with this long sought after "partnership", and
his eagerness to vaunt and display the sprinklings of Israeli "magnanimity". How
else can one interpret Tzipi Livni's recent announcement ( Haaretz, 15 August)
that Israel has linked progress in negotiations with normalization with the Arab
world? Israel has taken Palestinian negotiators hostage and is now blackmailing
Arab capitals.
Meanwhile, the eternally young 80-year-old Shimon Peres, who has just embarked
on a bright and promising future as president, has not let down people's hopes
and expectations. He has come up with some great ideas. We will hear more of
these, from his official residence in Talibiya, that elegant quarter in West
Jerusalem occupied in 1948 (will Arab delegations recall this as they pass by
the historic Arab homes that now house the Israeli upper class on their way to
pay homage at court?). Peres is in favor of returning 100 per cent of the West
Bank to the Palestinians, on condition that the Palestinians make up for this by
relinquishing all claim to East Jerusalem, its immediate surroundings and
outlying settlements, that will be annexed to Israel. This is probably just for
starters, but what he's getting at is a "land exchange" across the length of the
Green Line, which is densely populated by Arabs.
As usual, some Arabs have hailed his idea as a historic opportunity that should
not be allowed to slip by. I propose a simpler course: to admit the truth. The
truth is that the occupied territories are not real estate open to haggling over
the square footage and price, and that the question of Jerusalem, above all, is
not one that can be resolved through bartering and tradeoffs. The fact is that
Israel must accept the 1949 truce lines and withdraw to pre-June 1967 borders,
no more, no less. These principles do not need arguments to back them up so much
as strong negotiating resolve.
As for the Palestinians inside Israel, many fear that this talk of a land
exchange across the Green Line may be specifically designed for them, and they
have voiced tentative and vague objections to the Peres plan. In Israel, this
position has been interpreted as an indication of the desire of those Arabs to
hold on to Israeli citizenship, with those who reached this conclusion betraying
no small degree of smugness. After all, why else would those Arabs object to
becoming part of a Palestinian state, especially when that transformation comes
complete with the transfer of their villages, full Palestinian sovereignty over
that land, and Palestinian citizenship rights? So they argue. But it could
equally be pointed out that these Palestinians had never had a choice in the
matter. Israeli citizenship had been forced upon them. Has the situation
suddenly changed? The fact that some Arabs have opposed the Peres suggestion
suggests that it has not, and that this stance is, in fact, a protest in favor
of individual choice.
But there is more. Those Arab villages were never statelets annexable by this
country or that. They were part of a larger stretch of Palestinian land, most of
which Israel confiscated and the minimum amount of which it plans to return in
exchange for probably yet a larger stretch of land. Still, something else reeks;
and it was when Lieberman rejoiced at how easily the idea was accepted in
Israeli public opinion that one could identify the stench. Lieberman has long
advocated a "package deal" with the Palestinians that would enable Israel to get
rid of the largest possible number of Arabs inside Israel. Now there appears to
be a virtual unanimity over this type of solution -- even the Israeli left had
no moral problem with population transfer as long as it included their land.
Clearly, Arabs inside Israel should stick to their position. However, this
position needs to be clarified and it needs to be formulated in such a way as
not to compromise both national identity and individual citizen rights. I
propose the following as a reasonable and workable stance.
First, Israel must make a choice. Either it transfers Jericho and the entire
triangle to the Palestinian state in accordance with the boundaries defined in
the 1947 Partition Plan or it does not transfer anyone. In other words, it has
to choose between holding on to post-June 1967 boundaries and continuing to have
to sustain the costs of suppressing resistance against Zionism and the fight for
freedom and equality, or accepting pre-1967 borders. Second, the transfer of
only a portion of Palestinians and their land serves neither their cause nor the
cause of the Palestinians as a whole. Indeed, accepting such an exchange
vindicates the logic behind compromise on other major issues, of which Jerusalem
is just one. Third, it places a big question mark over the fate of Palestinians
remaining inside Israel. As Israel defines itself, they can never be fully equal
citizens, even though they will be profiled as citizens who chose Israel over
their national identity. At the same time, their loyalty to the state will
always be suspect and unless they prove themselves "worthy" they will remain
vulnerable to the threat of transfer, or to such "solutions" as granting them
one set of civil rights applicable to their place of residence and another set
of civil rights, such as the right to vote in Palestine, applicable to their
national identity. There is no end to the litany of mad ideas that could arise
once the precedent of treating the predicament of Palestinians in Israel
piecemeal has been set. Therefore, any notion of parceling out the fate of this
minority that makes up 20 per cent of the population of Israel should be
rejected out of hand.
Source: Al-Ahram Weekly
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