Putting the Iran Crisis in Context
Unsurprisingly, George W. Bush's announcement of a "surge" in Iraq came
despite the firm opposition to any such move of Americans and the even stronger
opposition of the (thoroughly irrelevant) Iraqis. It was accompanied by ominous
official leaks and statements -- from Washington and Baghdad -- about how
Iranian intervention in Iraq was aimed at disrupting our mission to gain
victory, an aim which is (by definition) noble. What then followed was a solemn
debate about whether serial numbers on advanced roadside bombs (IEDs) were
really traceable to Iran; and, if so, to that country's Revolutionary Guards or
to some even higher authority.
This "debate" is a typical illustration of a primary principle of sophisticated
propaganda. In crude and brutal societies, the Party Line is publicly proclaimed
and must be obeyed -- or else. What you actually believe is your own business
and of far less concern. In societies where the state has lost the capacity to
control by force, the Party Line is simply presupposed; then, vigorous debate is
encouraged within the limits imposed by unstated doctrinal orthodoxy. The cruder
of the two systems leads, naturally enough, to disbelief; the sophisticated
variant gives an impression of openness and freedom, and so far more effectively
serves to instill the Party Line. It becomes beyond question, beyond thought
itself, like the air we breathe.
The debate over Iranian interference in Iraq proceeds without ridicule on the
assumption that the United States owns the world. We did not, for example,
engage in a similar debate in the 1980s about whether the U.S. was interfering
in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, and I doubt that Pravda, probably recognizing
the absurdity of the situation, sank to outrage about that fact (which American
officials and our media, in any case, made no effort to conceal). Perhaps the
official Nazi press also featured solemn debates about whether the Allies were
interfering in sovereign Vichy France, though if so, sane people would then have
collapsed in ridicule.
In this case, however, even ridicule -- notably absent -- would not suffice,
because the charges against Iran are part of a drumbeat of pronouncements meant
to mobilize support for escalation in Iraq and for an attack on Iran, the
"source of the problem." The world is aghast at the possibility. Even in
neighboring Sunni states, no friends of Iran, majorities, when asked, favor a
nuclear-armed Iran over any military action against that country. From what
limited information we have, it appears that significant parts of the U.S.
military and intelligence communities are opposed to such an attack, along with
almost the entire world, even more so than when the Bush administration and Tony
Blair's Britain invaded Iraq, defying enormous popular opposition worldwide.
"The Iran Effect"
The results of an attack on Iran could be horrendous. After all, according to a
recent study of "the Iraq effect" by terrorism specialists Peter Bergen and Paul
Cruickshank, using government and Rand Corporation data, the Iraq invasion has
already led to a seven-fold increase in terror. The "Iran effect" would probably
be far more severe and long-lasting. British military historian Corelli Barnett
speaks for many when he warns that "an attack on Iran would effectively launch
World War III."
What are the plans of the increasingly desperate clique that narrowly holds
political power in the U.S.? We cannot know. Such state planning is, of course,
kept secret in the interests of "security." Review of the declassified record
reveals that there is considerable merit in that claim -- though only if we
understand "security" to mean the security of the Bush administration against
their domestic enemy, the population in whose name they act.
Even if the White House clique is not planning war, naval deployments, support
for secessionist movements and acts of terror within Iran, and other
provocations could easily lead to an accidental war. Congressional resolutions
would not provide much of a barrier. They invariably permit "national security"
exemptions, opening holes wide enough for the several aircraft-carrier battle
groups soon to be in the Persian Gulf to pass through -- as long as an
unscrupulous leadership issues proclamations of doom (as Condoleezza Rice did
with those "mushroom clouds" over American cities back in 2002). And the
concocting of the sorts of incidents that "justify" such attacks is a familiar
practice. Even the worst monsters feel the need for such justification and adopt
the device: Hitler's defense of innocent Germany from the "wild terror" of the
Poles in 1939, after they had rejected his wise and generous proposals for
peace, is but one example.
The most effective barrier to a White House decision to launch a war is the kind
of organized popular opposition that frightened the political-military
leadership enough in 1968 that they were reluctant to send more troops to
Vietnam -- fearing, we learned from the Pentagon Papers, that they might need
them for civil-disorder control.
Doubtless Iran's government merits harsh condemnation, including for its recent
actions that have inflamed the crisis. It is, however, useful to ask how we
would act if Iran had invaded and occupied Canada and Mexico and was arresting
U.S. government representatives there on the grounds that they were resisting
the Iranian occupation (called "liberation," of course). Imagine as well that
Iran was deploying massive naval forces in the Caribbean and issuing credible
threats to launch a wave of attacks against a vast range of sites -- nuclear and
otherwise -- in the United States, if the U.S. government did not immediately
terminate all its nuclear energy programs (and, naturally, dismantle all its
nuclear weapons). Suppose that all of this happened after Iran had overthrown
the government of the U.S. and installed a vicious tyrant (as the US did to Iran
in 1953), then later supported a Russian invasion of the U.S. that killed
millions of people (just as the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran
in 1980, killing hundreds of thousands of Iranians, a figure comparable to
millions of Americans). Would we watch quietly?
It is easy to understand an observation by one of Israel's leading military
historians, Martin van Creveld. After the U.S. invaded Iraq, knowing it to be
defenseless, he noted, "Had the Iranians not tried to build nuclear weapons,
they would be crazy."
Surely no sane person wants Iran (or any nation) to develop nuclear weapons. A
reasonable resolution of the present crisis would permit Iran to develop nuclear
energy, in accord with its rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but not
nuclear weapons. Is that outcome feasible? It would be, given one condition:
that the U.S. and Iran were functioning democratic societies in which public
opinion had a significant impact on public policy.
As it happens, this solution has overwhelming support among Iranians and
Americans, who generally are in agreement on nuclear issues. The
Iranian-American consensus includes the complete elimination of nuclear weapons
everywhere (82% of Americans); if that cannot yet be achieved because of elite
opposition, then at least a "nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East that
would include both Islamic countries and Israel" (71% of Americans).
Seventy-five percent of Americans prefer building better relations with Iran to
threats of force. In brief, if public opinion were to have a significant
influence on state policy in the U.S. and Iran, resolution of the crisis might
be at hand, along with much more far-reaching solutions to the global nuclear
conundrum.
Promoting Democracy -- at Home
These facts suggest a possible way to prevent the current crisis from exploding,
perhaps even into some version of World War III. That awesome threat might be
averted by pursuing a familiar proposal: democracy promotion -- this time at
home, where it is badly needed. Democracy promotion at home is certainly
feasible and, although we cannot carry out such a project directly in Iran, we
could act to improve the prospects of the courageous reformers and
oppositionists who are seeking to achieve just that. Among such figures who are,
or should be, well-known, would be Saeed Hajjarian, Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi,
and Akbar Ganji, as well as those who, as usual, remain nameless, among them
labor activists about whom we hear very little; those who publish the Iranian
Workers Bulletin may be a case in point.
We can best improve the prospects for democracy promotion in Iran by sharply
reversing state policy here so that it reflects popular opinion. That would
entail ceasing to make the regular threats that are a gift to Iranian
hardliners. These are bitterly condemned by Iranians truly concerned with
democracy promotion (unlike those "supporters" who flaunt democracy slogans in
the West and are lauded as grand "idealists" despite their clear record of
visceral hatred for democracy).
Democracy promotion in the United States could have far broader consequences. In
Iraq, for instance, a firm timetable for withdrawal would be initiated at once,
or very soon, in accord with the will of the overwhelming majority of Iraqis and
a significant majority of Americans. Federal budget priorities would be
virtually reversed. Where spending is rising, as in military supplemental bills
to conduct the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would sharply decline. Where
spending is steady or declining (health, education, job training, the promotion
of energy conservation and renewable energy sources, veterans benefits, funding
for the UN and UN peacekeeping operations, and so on), it would sharply
increase. Bush's tax cuts for people with incomes over $200,000 a year would be
immediately rescinded.
The U.S. would have adopted a national health-care system long ago, rejecting
the privatized system that sports twice the per-capita costs found in similar
societies and some of the worst outcomes in the industrial world. It would have
rejected what is widely regarded by those who pay attention as a "fiscal train
wreck" in-the-making. The U.S. would have ratified the Kyoto Protocol to reduce
carbon-dioxide emissions and undertaken still stronger measures to protect the
environment. It would allow the UN to take the lead in international crises,
including in Iraq. After all, according to opinion polls, since shortly after
the 2003 invasion, a large majority of Americans have wanted the UN to take
charge of political transformation, economic reconstruction, and civil order in
that land.
If public opinion mattered, the U.S. would accept UN Charter restrictions on the
use of force, contrary to a bipartisan consensus that this country, alone, has
the right to resort to violence in response to potential threats, real or
imagined, including threats to our access to markets and resources. The U.S.
(along with others) would abandon the Security Council veto and accept majority
opinion even when in opposition to it. The UN would be allowed to regulate arms
sales; while the U.S. would cut back on such sales and urge other countries to
do so, which would be a major contribution to reducing large-scale violence in
the world. Terror would be dealt with through diplomatic and economic measures,
not force, in accord with the judgment of most specialists on the topic but
again in diametric opposition to present-day policy.
Furthermore, if public opinion influenced policy, the U.S. would have diplomatic
relations with Cuba, benefiting the people of both countries (and, incidentally,
U.S. agribusiness, energy corporations, and others), instead of standing
virtually alone in the world in imposing an embargo (joined only by Israel, the
Republic of Palau, and the Marshall Islands). Washington would join the broad
international consensus on a two-state settlement of the Israel-Palestine
conflict, which (with Israel) it has blocked for 30 years -- with scattered and
temporary exceptions -- and which it still blocks in word, and more importantly
in deed, despite fraudulent claims of its commitment to diplomacy. The U.S.
would also equalize aid to Israel and Palestine, cutting off aid to either party
that rejected the international consensus.
Evidence on these matters is reviewed in my book Failed States as well as in The
Foreign Policy Disconnect by Benjamin Page (with Marshall Bouton), which also
provides extensive evidence that public opinion on foreign (and probably
domestic) policy issues tends to be coherent and consistent over long periods.
Studies of public opinion have to be regarded with caution, but they are
certainly highly suggestive.
Democracy promotion at home, while no panacea, would be a useful step towards
helping our own country become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international
order (to adopt the term used for adversaries), instead of being an object of
fear and dislike throughout much of the world. Apart from being a value in
itself, functioning democracy at home holds real promise for dealing
constructively with many current problems, international and domestic, including
those that literally threaten the survival of our species.
Noam Chomsky, voted the world's top public intellectual, is the author of Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy (Metropolitan Books), just published in paperback, among many other
works.
Comments posted are the sole opinion of the author and may not necessarily reflect the opinions of AIM. |
